To facilitate price discovery, Euronext Paris has always relied on a transparent pre- We show that slow brokers submit orders very early, and most of them are executed within the day. In contrast, fast prop traders or dedicated liquidity providers only participate in the last half-hour. Interestingly the pre-opening activity of slow brokers is strongly related to the price discovery process across trading platforms. Finally, we show that although tentative clearing prices of the preopen contain information, they are followed by a reversal in the following 15 minutes across the different platforms, reflecting price pressure and liquidity issues around the open.
Introduction
Liquidity issues in financial markets arise because of two main factors: asymmetric information (Kyle, 1985) and cost of market participation (Grossman and Miller, 1988) . To alleviate these frictions, several exchanges start with a pre-opening period characterized by the accumulation of orders and the absence of trade execution. Since its very beginning in 1986, Euronext Paris has implemented a transparent pre-opening phase followed by a call auction to open continuous trading sessions. During the pre-opening period, each time a new message is posted, an indicative clearing price is determined and publicly disseminated, similar to a tâtonnement process. The release of this pre-trade information aims at reducing information asymmetries. In a seminal paper, Biais et al. (1999) show that this tâtonnement process facilitates price discovery by reducing price uncertainty after the market has been temporarily closed.
In the last decade, changes in technologies and in regulation have profoundly reshaped financial markets. The decreasing volume at the open (down from 10% to 2%), the complex role of fast traders and the increasing competition of alternative trading platforms put into question the findings of Biais et al. (1999) . In particular, during the period we study in 2012 and 2013, Euronext Paris offers a pre-opening period from 07:15 to 09:00 am, while BATS and Chi-X Europe, the two main competitors, directly start trading in a continuous limit order book without holding opening call auction.
1,2 This paper uses the difference in opening mechanisms across trading platforms to empirically investigate the role of the pre-opening offered by Euronext Paris. Beyond this difference, we also exploit detailed information on the order submission during the pre-call period (i.e., speed and the nature of the message's submission) to analyze the price formation process on the exchange itself and on the two competing trading platforms (BATS and Chi-X Europe).
Our sample is composed of the cross-traded French stocks of the SBF 120 index, and spans from May 2, 2012 to December 31, 2013. Data are provided by Eurofidai-Bedofih and consist of trades and quotes on Euronext Paris, BATS and Chi-X Europe, but also 1 An opening call auction with a random end period has been implemented on BATS on January 30, 2015. It consists of a 10-minute pre-opening period from 8:50am (Paris time) to 9:00am.
2 These platforms operate continuously from 9:00am until 5:30pm (Paris time). They use market data from the primary market for example the tick size, or the Primary Best Bid Best Offer (PBBO) which corresponds to the midpoint of the relevant Best Bid and Offer quoted on the listing (or primary) market. To guarantee attractive prices to investors, the matching of orders on all three trading platforms is subject to a price check. However, the alternative platforms apply different tolerance levels. Generally, an order will be rejected if it executes a certain percentage above the European Best Bid or below the European best offer. Trading rules may thus differ from one platform to another. by the member to post the order, which identifies whether the order is submitted on behalf of a client (client), on the member's own account (prop trader), or as dedicated marketmaker (liquidity provider). We relate measures of market liquidity and price discovery on each trading platforms to the pre-opening behavior of traders on Euronext. This enables us to address the following questions: Do pre-opening periods still contribute to the overall price discovery and to liquidity formation in fragmented markets? Do differences across traders' behavior during the preopening explain the economic role of the pre-open?
Our main results are as follows. First, opening clearing prices contain information on end-of-the-day prices, and the volume cleared at the opening call auction on Euronext is positively correlated with the daily trading volume on all platforms, Euronext, BATS and Chi-X. Second, the pre-opening messages' submission is very different across traders' categories. In particular, we find that slow brokers submit messages very early in the preopening session, namely in the first half-hour from 7:15 to 7:45am. Their activity then declines to rebound in the last half-hour before the opening. More than half of the orders submitted in the first half-hour are filled at least partially either during the opening call auction or during the day. This suggests that slow brokers may participate early in order to gain time priority or to advertise trading needs, possibly to compensate their speed disadvantage. By contrast, MIXED prop traders are very active in the last 15 minutes before the opening call auction, and updates and cancellations represent more than a third of their messages, consistent with an important monitoring activity. Strikingly, dedicated market-makers (in particular fast liquidity suppliers) hardly supply liquidity at the open.
Third, we compute tentative clearing prices and volumes during the pre-opening, that is, prices at which the largest number of shares would trade given orders standing in the book. We use snapshots of the limit order book rebuilt by Eurofidai-Bedofih every 15 minutes during the pre-open to build cumulated demand and supply functions. When the highest bid and the lowest ask cross, we report the tentative opening price and tentative opening volume. When they don't, we use the lowest ask and highest bid quotes to compute a pre-opening midquote, provided that limit orders exist on both sides of the limit order book. We then investigate whether pre-opening prices contribute to the daily price discovery. We find that the return from the close to time τ of the pre-open is significantly positively related to the close-to-close return, and that the economic and statistical significance of this relation increases over time during the pre-opening period.
We interpret this as evidence that tentative prices contain information. The fact that prices observed late at the end of the pre-opening period are related to end-of-the-day prices has first been documented by Biais et al. (1999) . Interestingly, this result also holds, to a lesser extent, to very early tentative prices and to tentative midquotes, that is, when demand and supply do not cross. However, even though pre-opening tentative clearing prices contain information on the end-of-the-day prices, we find a significant negative relation between the return from the close to time τ of the pre-open and the return from the open to 9:15am. By contrast, when there is no cross during the pre-opening period, the evolution of prices based on tentative midquotes is not followed by a price reversal after the opening call auction.
Fourth, we investigate the correlations between the activity measured by the tentative clearing volume during the pre-open and the subsequent trading activity in the continuous session across the three platforms. We document a positive and significant relation between the tentative opening volume and the daily volume for each of the three trading platforms. This is consistent with various economic mechanisms (order splitting, new strategies tested, sunshine trading, or information leakage on liquidity needs). We also find a negative and significant relation between tentative clearing volumes and average daily spreads across the three platforms.
Finally, we relate measures of liquidity and price discovery during the day for each of the three platforms with the pre-opening behaviors of market participants on Euronext.
We find that daily spreads are negatively related to the number of preopening messages submitted MIXED prop traders. We also find that the pre-opening activity of slow brokers and slow liquidity suppliers is significantly positively related to the informational content of opening prices, and significantly and negatively related to price reversals.
Our paper contributes to papers analyzing the pre-opening and opening of trading platforms. Several papers show that the pre-call phase significantly contributes to price discovery (see, among others, Biais et al. (1999) for the Paris Bourse, Cao et al. (2000) for the NASDAQ, Davies (2003) for the Toronto Stock Exchange, Ellul et al. (2005) for the London Stock Exchange, or Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) for the NYSE).
Using data related to limit order books, Hoffmann and Van Bommel (2009) show that the transparent opening call auction used by Euronext leads to more price discovery than the opaque mechanism implemented by Xetra, the German Exchange. Recently, using detailed data on HFT vs. NON HFT participants, Bellia et al. (2016) and Bellia et al. (2017) show that the pre-opening activity of fast traders lead price discovery on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and on Euronext Paris respectively. Our paper enriches this strand of literature by showing that even if the opening call auction on Euronext attracts less liquidity than when the market was consolidated, it is still an efficient mechanism for discovering prices not only on the exchange itself but also, by externality, on other competing platforms without call auctions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the role of the pre-opening period and develops the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes data, sample selection and provides descriptive statistics related to the pre-opening and opening auctions on Euronext. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The role of the pre-opening period
The trading environment
Euronext is the seventh largest market in the world (World Federation of Exchange, 2015 Opening call auctions take place after an overnight trading halt, during which new information has accumulated. By concentrating buying and selling interests, the objectives of call auctions include (i) discovering the price after a period of no trade (see, for instance, the model of Vives (1995) ) and (ii) improving quantity discovery (Chakraborty et al., 2012) . Corroborating these theoretical predictions, some empirical studies (e.g., Biais et al. (1999) or Comerton-Forde (1999) ) find that call auctions make opening prices more informative. The Euronext market opening is very active and accounts, on average, for 1.3% (resp. 1.8%) of total trading volume for large stocks (resp. small stocks) (see Table   3 presented below). This percentage is however much lower than the 10% found by Biais et al. (1999) (Nagel, 2012) . At the extreme, opening price reversal could also be due to some manipulative activities aiming at artificially inflating opening prices for a short period (a practice known as "marking the open"). Even if call auctions make manipulation more costly, Medrano and Vives (2001) show that an informed trader may choose to follow a contrarian strategy to manipulate prices during a preopening session. Because BATS and Chi-X do not have preopening nor opening call auctions, we thus test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Opening price reversals are observed on Euronext and not on BATS nor on Chi-X.
Pre-opening period
Although no trades take place and orders can be canceled at no cost, empirical studies
show that non-binding pre-opening orders submitted late in the pre-opening improve price discovery (Biais et al. (1999) , Cao et al. (2000) ). The study of the order submission process during the pre-opening phase should help understanding how the opening call auction on Euronext contributes to discovering opening prices and whether it has an impact on other trading platforms deprived of this mechanism. In particular, signaling vs. manipulative behaviors could be detected using the timing of orders during the pre-open or the category of accounts/traders submitting orders (client, liquidity supplier or prop trader/HFT or non-HFT).
First, remind that price-time priority is enforced during the pre-opening period. Submitting an order very early during the pre-opening period without canceling it enables traders to gain priority in the limit order book and during the opening call auction. Liquidity traders might thus be willing to post such very early orders. Moreover posting messages very early is a way to advertise liquidity needs (consistently with Hypothesis 3).
Brokers (using the client account) in particular might choose to follow such strategy:
Hypothesis 5 Market participants with liquidity needs submit orders very early during the pre-opening period without canceling them.
Second, all participants willing to get their orders being executed during the opening call auction face a trade-off. On the one hand, they may choose to post their orders as late as possible to hide their trading intentions and to avoid being "picked off" or sniped by faster traders (like HFT prop traders). On the other hand, the probability of execution of their orders decreases the closer they get to the opening time (either due to price then time priority, or due to a stochastic failure, as modeled by Calcagno and Lovo (2010) ). This reasoning should hold for market participants with liquidity needs (typically customers)
willing to avoid parasitic traders, and informed traders (typically prop traders) willing to avoid information leakage. We thus formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6 Order submission increases with time during the pre-opening period. Orders' contribution to price discovery steadily increases.
Third, since the pre-opening period is transparent and can be used by strategic agents as a pre-play signaling device, any trader might use information contained in the preopening game to trade across all platforms:
Hypothesis 7 Because the transparent pre-opening period is used as a signaling device, there exists: 1. a positive correlation between tentative prices (resp. volumes) set during the pre-opening period, and the price (resp. volume) after the opening across all trading platforms, and 2. a correlation between the number of pre-opening messages and market liquidity across all trading venues.
An alternative explanation for the pre-opening activity would be an attempt to manipulate prices, an effect that has been experimentally documented by Biais et al. (2013) and theoretically shown by Medrano and Vives (2001) . Manipulation might however be difficult to show. Opening price reversal due to manipulation might not be very different from a liquidity supply strategy that absorbs price pressure at the open, which might exacerbate inventory exposure (see Lescourret (2016) 
Sample selection
Our sample consists of French stocks constituting the SBF120 index that are traded across Euronext Paris, BATS and Chi-X Europe, spanning twenty months from May 2, 2012 to December 31, 2013. We drop 7 stocks which do not belong to the index on January 1, 2012, 13 additional stocks which are not traded continuously on BATS and Chi-X during our sample period. 16 Our final sample consists of 99 stocks and 416 trading days.
12 Bedofih stands for Base Europénne de DOnnées FInancièresà Haute fréquence. 13 Euronext quotes data are rebuilt by Bedofih from a replay of the market. Bedofih provides us with two quantities on each side: one quantity that does not incorporate hidden depth, and one that does.
14 Related parties are often subsidiaries of a financial institution which trade with the membership ID of the latter, under its supervision.
15 Their categorization of speed is a function of the capacity of the member to send multiple messages within one second. This information is provided by Euronext. The French Market Authorities additionally takes into account the effective speed and the behavior of institutions to flag a member as HFT. 16 We drop 4 trading days that are characterized by a half-day of trading (December 24 and 31, 2012 and 2013) and the subsequent days for which we cannot compute the close-to-close return, and 1 day during which Euronext faced technical issues (June 6, 2013 We split the sample in two by capitalization group. Panel A (Index ) is composed of the 50 stocks that belong either to the CAC40 (32 stocks) or to the CACNext20 (18 stocks) indexes. Panel B (Non Index ) contains 49 stocks that do not belong to these indexes and mainly represent small caps.
Definition of variables
In the following, we index trading platforms by S, where S = E for Euronext, S = B for BATS and S = C for Chi-X. Day is indexed by t and the subscript for stocks is omitted for brevity.
Price discovery
Our main variables of interest relate to price discovery. We define the close-to-close return
where CLOSEP t is the closing price on day t and DIV t is the dividend paid on day t.
Similarly, we define the close-to-open return r
where OP EN P t is the opening price on day t, and finally the open-to-9:15am return as
where M Q 9:15 S t is the midquote at 9:15am on the trading platform S.
To investigate the impact of the pre-opening messages activity in the pre-opening period on price discovery, we define the following dummy variables: D IC is a dummy due to data reporting issues (e.g., missing quotes). 
where midquotes at 9:15am are taken from the trading platform S (S = E, B and C).
Liquidity and trading activity of the day
We construct measures of trading activity, for each stock, each day, and each trading platform S, namely: the number of trades N BT R S t , the trade size T S S t in e, the traded volume V S t in million e, the market share defined as M S
, and the transaction price P S t . We set volumes and number of trades to zero when there is no trading in the trading platform S and no trading halt reported by Euronext (S = E, B and C).
As a proxy for volatility, we compute the relative price range defined by Parkinson (1980) as
where P it is the price of transaction i t executed on day t.
We also use information contained in the proprietary variables provided by EurofidaiBedofih, namely the account's type and the HFT flag, to construct measures of trading activity by member's category. The traded volume for each category of member (client, prop trader, liquidity provider, retail client, related party / HFT, NON-HFT, MIXED)
is measured in absolute terms and relative to the total traded volume.
We measure market liquidity by using the relative quoted spread RSP D S t defined as the difference between the highest bid and the smallest ask divided by the mid-quote. We also use the depth in euro Depth S t , defined as the average between the e volume available at the best bid and the e volume available at the best ask in the limit order book of the trading platform S (S = E, B and C).
Preopening messages activity
In order to be able to investigate the dynamics of the pre-opening period, we define seven 15-minute intervals between 7:15am and 9:00 am, which we index by i, where i = that is, the number of new orders submitted SU BM i , the number of updates M ODIF i , the number of cancellations CAN CEL i , and their value relative to the total number of messages M SG i defined as the sum of the three categories of messages (new, update and cancellation), that is, respectively %SU BM i , %M ODIF i , and %CAN CEL i . We build measures related to the life of pre-opening messages. For each new order submitted during the pre-opening period, we identify whether the order has been (at least partially) executed at the opening (EXECOP EN i ), or (at least partially) executed during the day 
Preopening and opening prices and volumes
We compute tentative clearing price and volume that would prevail if the opening call auction would occur at that time. We use 15-min snapshots of Euronext limit order book When the cumulated demand and supply functions cross, we select the tentative clearing price T OP τ t that maximizes the number of shares traded, from which a tentative clearing volume T OV τ t results. When the cumulated demand and supply functions do not cross, especially early in the pre-opening session, we compute a preopening midquote T M Q τ as the average between the best ask price and the best bid price if both sides of the book are not empty. In the latter case, the corresponding tentative opening volume is equal to zero. Then we compute the return from the close to time τ of the preopen as follows:
where Dnocross τ is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if there exists no cross at time τ and zero otherwise and CLOSEP t−1 is the closing price of the previous trading day.
Notice that these pre-opening prices and volumes may be computed by Euronext members with the information that they have at their disposal. Table 2 reports summary statistics related to market activity and market liquidity across all stock-day observations in panel.
Insert Table 2 here Table 2 shows that, on Euronext, the number of trades of index stocks amounts to 5,369 on average, which is five times larger than for non-index stocks (1,008 on average).
Relative spreads of index stocks amount, on average, to 6.8 bp (Panel Index ), while nonindex stocks (Panel Non Index ) are three times more illiquid (18.1 bp on average). As expected, trading activity and market liquidity thus increase with market capitalization. All measures show that, despite market fragmentation, Euronext remains the dominant market in terms of liquidity and trading activity for French stocks, followed by Chi-X and then by BATS. Table 3 reports statistics on opening prices and volumes.
The opening call auction
Insert Table 3 here
To address the economic importance of the opening, we standardize measures related to the opening activity by the corresponding measures computed across the total trading day. We report this proportion in the second column of the table. The opening auction volume represents only 1.6% (resp. 1.3%) of the total number of daily trades (resp. total daily trading volume) of index stocks. For non-index stocks, the opening call auction on Euronext accounts, on average, for 2.5% of the total number of daily trades and 1.8% of the total daily volume, which is slightly higher. These numbers strikingly contrast with Biais et al. (1999) who find that trading at the opening represents about 10% of the total daily trading volume for CAC40 stocks.
Although the opening auction represents a smaller fraction of the total daily volume, it may still contribute to the price and liquidity discovery. To analyze the contribution of the opening auction to liquidity discovery, we build various time series correlations between volume resulting from the call auction and those of the continuous trading session, namely the correlations between the volume at the open, V Open , and the total daily volume on each of the three trading platforms, V S (S = E, B and C). To further investigate its contribution to price discovery, we compute the ratio of the close-to-open return, r CO to the close-to-close return, r CC . If opening prices are informative, we expect the ratio to be positive. The closer the ratio is from one, the more informative the opening price would be. When the ratio is larger than one, there is some price reversal during the continuous trading session. Table 3 shows that opening clearing prices incorporate on average 0.33% of the daily price change for index stocks (Panel Index ), and 0.44% for small non-index stocks (Panel Non Index ). We also compute the time series correlations between the close-to-close return r CC and the close-to-open return r CO . We find that the correlation between the close-to-close return, r CC , and the close-toopen return, r CO , is on average positive and equal to 0.404 for index stocks (Panel Index ), and to 0.365 for non-index stocks (Panel Non Index ), suggesting that opening prices tend to move in the same direction as daily prices. This correlation is not significantly different from zero even at 10%, as indicated by the result of a t-test based on the cross-section of correlations. These results suggest that the opening call auction still contributes to the daily price discovery, corroborating Hypothesis 1.
Members
To better identify the key participants, we decompose the trading volume (in euros)
depending on the characteristics of the members.
Insert Table 4 Table 4 Panel (b) reports the decomposition of the trading volume during the continuous trading session, by members' account (in row) and type (in column). The last column indicates the total proportion of the total volume traded during the day by account (across 18 We also exclude the volume executed at the open in Euronext before computing the correlation with the pre-opening volume and results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. speed categories). Prop. traders are the largest contributors to the daily trading volume (with 45% for index stocks and 53% for non-index stocks), followed by brokers trading on behalf of clients and liquidity providers. The latter represent 29% of the volume for index stocks, but only 5% for non-index stocks. This finding may be surprising given that liquidity programs were initially designed by Euronext to guarantee the liquidity of smaller caps; it can be explained by Euronext's Supplemental Liquidity Provider (SLP) program implemented for a subset of stocks (mainly large caps), that offers lower fees for program participants as a counterpart for liquidity provision. Figure 2b ). In addition, the market share at the opening call auction for each member's category (detailed in Table   4 ) is also represented both in Figure 2a to the other categories, suggesting that their new orders are placed quite far from the tentative clearing price in the limit order book. As a result, new orders should not need to be monitored (in line with the quasi-absence of updates and the low cancellation rate).
In conclusion, pre-opening trading strategies seem very different across members' categories. In particular, the message activity exhibits a very different pattern across slow brokers, MIXED prop traders and fast (or HFT) prop traders. Figure 3 illustrates the life of pre-opening orders, for each 15-min interval. A breakdown by members' type and account is also reported.
Insert Figure 3 here Insert Figure 4 here Figure 4a shows that early orders are more aggressive than late ones. The breakdown by member's type in Figures 4b and 4c shows that MIXED traders are more tempted to submit aggressive orders while the breakdown by members' account shows that liquidity providers in particular early during the pre-opening submit more aggressive orders than late ones. Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for tentative clearing prices and volumes in the preopening session.
Price discovery during the pre-opening period 4.2.1 Tentative prices and volumes
Insert Table 5 here Table 5 shows that the number of crosses increases as the opening approaches, which is quite consistent with the replenishment of the book during that period. When a tentative clearing price exists, the correlation between the return from the close to time τ of the pre-open, r CT OPτ , and the close-to-open return, r CO , is positive and increases over time to reach 0.446 at 8:45am. This reflects that tentative clearing prices are a good predictor of the opening price and contribute to the opening price discovery. The same holds for the correlation with the close-to-close return, r CC , suggesting that tentative clearing prices also contribute to the daily price discovery. Interestingly, even when there is no cross, tentative midquotes are also positively correlated with the opening and closing clearing prices. This correlation increases over time, showing that the pre-opening limit order book contains information favoring price discovery.
By contrast, the correlation between the return from the close to time τ of the preopen, r CT OPτ , and the return from the open to 9:15am is negative in each of the three platforms,
showing some price reversal on each trading platforms.
Results also indicate that the correlation between the tentative clearing volume and the daily volume traded either on Euronext or on the other competing platforms, BATS and CHI-X, increases with time. This is consistent with a pre-opening mechanism on
Euronext which favors quantity discovery over the three platforms.
Informational content of pre-opening tentative prices
We formally test the pre-opening price contribution to the opening price discovery by estimating a regression model based on Biais et al. (1999) , i.e.:
where r CPτ is the return from the previous close to time τ and r CC is the close-to-close Whether there exists a cross or not, pre-opening prices have some informational content. Coefficients α 1,τ are positive and significant. Surprisingly, this is the case even early during the pre-opening period. We also notice that the informational content of tentative clearing prices increases during the last hour, consistently with Hypothesis 6.
19 Barclay and Hendershott (2003) and Cao et al. (2000) measure the size of the contribution of the pre-opening period to the daily price discovery by estimating the weighted price contribution (WPC) of the pre-opening interval τ . The WPC is a proxy for the proportion of the close-to-close price evolution that is discovered during interval τ . While conceptually similar, the approach followed Biais et al. (1999) is more direct and the model can easily be extended to account for additional explanatory variables. 20 The exact values of the estimates of these regressions can be found in Table App .1 in the Online Appendix. Results of regressions without fixed effects are qualitatively similar.
Price reversal
To examine whether the pre-opening prices contain information unrelated to fundamentals (either due to manipulation or to liquidity supply), we investigate whether there exists a significant price rebound in the 15 minutes following the opening call auction. We run the following regression: 
21
Insert Figure 6 here Figure 6 shows that the coefficient β 1,τ is negative and significant across all trading platforms. This suggests that there is an "overshooting" in the formation of the opening price, shortly followed by a reversal. By contrast, when there is no cross between supply and demand, the coefficients β 1,τ are insignificant: the evolution of tentative midquotes is not followed by a price reversal. In this case, no order is executed, or, in other words, no order supplies liquidity. This would suggest that the price reversal observed when there is a cross would be caused by order imbalances accommodated at the opening by some orders supplying liquidity or immediacy, in line with Hypothesis 7a.
Quantity discovery 4.3.1 Daily activity and pre-opening tentative volumes
This section examines whether the pre-opening mechanism facilitates quantity discovery and liquidity formation. If some traders were to reveal information on their liquidity needs, then one has to expect that tentative clearing volumes predict daily activity and market activity. To study this effect, we run the following regression:
The tentative opening volume is equal to zero when there is no cross between the cumulated supply and demand functions. Figure 7 plots Insert Figure 7 here
Spreads and pre-opening tentative volumes
To examine the impact of the pre-opening period on the liquidity of the trading day, we estimate the following regression:
where the left-hand side variable RSP D S j,t is the relative quoted spread in stock j on day t on platform S, and D cross is a dummy that is equal to one if there is a cross in the pre-opening, and zero otherwise. The coefficient δ First, results show that a larger tentative clearing volume is related to lower spreads for the three platforms. Second, days when there is not cross during the last half-hour correspond to days where spreads are significantly higher on Euronext (consistent with our previous finding showing a lack of liquidity supply); this is however not the case on the other competing platforms, BATS and CHI-X. This suggests that the absence of cross late during the pre-opening of Euronext is related to events specific to this platform. 22 The exact values of the estimates of these regressions can be found in Table App .3 in the Online Appendix. Results of regressions without fixed effects are qualitatively similar. 23 The exact values of the estimates of these regressions are found in Table App Insert Table 6 here Table 6 report the results of the regression for the three different platforms. Interestingly, daily spreads are significantly and negatively related to the activity of MIXED prop traders across the three platforms, which seem thus to supply liquidity. By contrast, spreads on BATS and CHI-X are positively and significantly related to the activity of slow brokers. Spreads are also negatively related to the level of the pre-opening activity.
The more active is the pre-open, the more liquid are trading platforms.
Price discovery and pre-opening activity
To investigate the impact of members' messages submission activity during the preopening period on price discovery, we run the panel logistic regression: Insert Table 7 here Table 7 presents two specifications, according to whether the dependent variable is Table 7 indicates that the higher is the pre-opening activity of NON-HFT brokers or liquidity suppliers, the more likely it is that there is a price continuation on Euronext. We also note that the higher the High-Low volatility is, the more likely opening prices contain daily information (corroborating the link between price discovery and volatility). The opening auction may be followed by a price reversal; the probability of an opening price reversal is negatively related to the activity of slow brokers and MIXED prop traders across the three trading platforms, but positively related to the activity of HFT clients on Euronext (not significant for the other platforms). Overall, the participation of slow brokers seems to be related to a better price discovery process.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the role of the pre-opening mechanism implemented by Euronext on the price discovery and liquidity formation of the exchange itself and on two other competing platforms deprived of such a mechanism, BATS and Chi-X. To this aim, we investigate whether there is a relationship between the pre-opening messages activity and the daily liquidity for each trading platform. Using the SBF120 index constituents, from May 2, 2012 to December 31, 2013, we find evidence that tentative clearing prices set during the pre-opening period contribute to discover opening prices. The informational content of pre-opening tentative clearing prices increases the closer one gets to the opening.
Moreover, we find that the tentative clearing volume is positively correlated with the liquidity in the three platforms. Interestingly, we find that the preopening message activity of slow brokers is significantly positively related to price discovery, unlike the preopening messages activity of fast prop traders, while the pre-opening activity MIXED prop traders is significantly related to a better liquidity across platforms. A natural question which emerges is whether slow brokers (and behind, potentially, large mutual funds) have taken over the previous role of dedicated market-makers (such as the specialist) which were participating actively to the auction and to the price discovery process at the open, and which is clearly not any more the case in our data. Figure 3 shows the final execution status of each newly submitted order by 15-min interval. There are three possible status: (i) the order has been executed, at the opening call auction (in black); (ii) the order has been executed within the day (in grey); (iii) the order has not been executed (in hatched black). In the latter case, the order might have been canceled, modified or not and remains in the limit order book. Each bar represents the total number of submissions received during the 15-min interval and it is decomposed into the three possible execution status. Figure 3b decomposes the execution status of pre-opening orders by trader's type (HFT, MIXED or NON-HFT). Figure 3c decomposes the execution status by trader's account (clients, prop traders, or liquidity providers). + ε i,t . Bars correspond to estimates of the regression when there is a cross at time τ , and there exists a tentative clearing price, T OP τ . Squares correspond to estimates when there is no cross at time τ and pre-opening returns are computed using a tentative midquote, T M Q τ , that is, an average price between the best ask and the best bid quotes if the book is not empty, where τ =7: 30, 7:45, 8:00, 8:15, 8:30, and 8:45am . Fill patterns (plain, medium hatched, and lightly dotted) indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The exact values of the estimates of these regressions can be found in Table App .1 in the Online Appendix. CC on TOP CC on TMQ Figure 6 : Reversal around the opening on Euronext, BATS and Chi-X Figure 6 reports the estimates of the price reversal between pre-opening prices and midquotes observed 15 minutes after the opening at 9:00am. We run a regression for each preopening prices computed every 15 minutes, and for each trading platform S on which the midquote at 9:15am is observed, where S = E, B, C. The dependent variable corresponds to the open-to-9:15am return and the independent variable corresponds to the return between the close and the pre-opening price at time τ : r O,9:15
+ ε i,t , where r O,9:15 S is the return from the opening price to the midquote at 9:15am observed on platform S. Bars correspond to estimates of the regression when the pre-opening price is the tentative opening price, T OP τ , that is, when supply and demand function cumulated during the interval ending at time τ cross. Colors correspond the trading platform: dark grey for S = E (Euronext), medium grey for S = B (BATS), and light grey for S = C (Chi-X). Triangles, circles and diamonds correspond to estimates when the pre-opening price is the tentative midquote, T M Q τ , that is, when there is no cross at time τ for τ =7: 30, 7:45, 8:00,8:15, 8:30 and 8:45am . In both cases, fill patterns (plain, medium hatched, and lightly dotted) indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The exact values of the estimates of these regressions are in Table App .2 in the Online Appendix. :30, 7:45, 8:00,8:15, 8:30 and 8:45am . The dependent variable V S corresponds to the volume traded during the day on platform S expressed in million e. The independent variable, T OV τ , corresponds to the tentative volume expressed in million eand computed at time τ . All regressions include stock fixed effects and day clustering. Bars correspond to estimates of the regression. Colors correspond the the platform: dark grey for S = E (Euronext), medium grey for S = B (BATS), and light grey for S = C (CHI-X). Fill patterns (plain, medium hatched, and lightly dotted) indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The exact values of the estimates of these regressions can be found in Table App .3 in the Online Appendix. :30, 7:45, 8:00,8:15, 8:30 and 8:45am . The dependent variable RSP D S corresponds to the daily averaged relative bid-ask spread on platform S. The independent variables correspond to the log of the tentative pre-opening volume at time τ expressed in million e. Dcross is a dummy that takes value 1 when there is a cross and 0 otherwise, and Dnocross τ = 1 − Dcross τ . All regressions include stock fixed effects and day clustering. Bars correspond to estimates of the regression when the tentative price is the tentative opening price, T OP , that is, when demand and supply cross at time τ . Colors correspond the the platform: dark grey for S =Euronext, medium grey for S =BATS, and light grey for S =CHI-X. Triangles, circles and diamonds correspond to estimates when the tentative price is the tentative midquote, T M Q, that is, when demand and supply do not cross at time τ . In both cases, fill patterns (plain, medium hatched, and lightly dotted) indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The exact values of the estimates of these regressions can be found in Table App .4 in the Online Appendix. 
, where CLOSEP t is the closing price on day t and DIV t is the dividend paid on day t. σ r CC is the standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns. HILO t is the daily price range defined as
× 100, where P it is the price of transaction i t executed on day t. The number of trading days with at least one trade on Euronext, BATS and Chi-X is reported. All measures are averaged first by stock then across stocks in the Panel. , where S = Euronext, BATS and Chi-X. Trade size is the absolute value of shares of a trade expressed in e. Relative Spread is the difference between the best ask and the best bid, divided by the mid-quote which is the average between the best ask and the best bid. Depth corresponds to the average quantity available at the best ask and at the best bid, expressed in euros. All measures are averaged across stock-day observations. :30, 7:45, 8:00, 8:15, 8:30, 8 :45}, we build the cumulated demand and supply function. # crosses is the number of times the demand and supply functions cross. # no cross is the number of times the demand and supply functions do not cross. # no cross (s.t. a midquote exists) is the number of times the supply and demand functions do not cross, the limit order book is not empty and the best ask and the best bid are used to compute a midquote. r CT OPτ is the return from the close to the tentative opening price T OP τ calculated when supply and demand functions cross. r CT M Qτ is the return from the close to the preopening midquote T M Q τ at time τ computed when there is no cross. The tentative opening volume is the result of the tentative call auction. The other variables are defined in the caption of Table 3 . All measures are averaged across stock-day observations. Table 6 : Relation between market liquidity and pre-opening activity
This table reports the estimates of the relation between the pre-opening activity of members (classified by type and account) and relative quoted spreads. The dependent variable RSP D S corresponds to the daily averaged relative bid-ask spread on platform S, where S =Euronext (E), BATS (B) or Chi-X (C). The independent variables correspond to the log of the number of messages submitted by different categories of members (HFT, NON-HFT, MIXED / clients, prop traders and liquidity suppliers). T otal#messages is the total number of pre-opening messages (new orders, updates, or cancelations). The symbols ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable:
(1) 
